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Abstract—This note describes laser fault experiments on an 8-
bit 0.35µm microcontroller with no countermeasures. We show
that reproducible single-byte faults, often considered unfeasible,
can be obtained by careful beam-size and shot-instant tuning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fault attacks consist in using hardware malfunction to infer
secrets from the target’s faulty outputs. Within fault attacks,
Differential Fault Analysis [2] (DFA) is a particular analysis
technique exploiting differences between correct and faulty
outputs. We refer the reader to [13] for more information on
fault injection techniques.
This note describes laser faults experiments on an 8-bit
0.35µm RISC microcontroller with no countermeasures. We
show that reproducible single-byte faults, often considered
unfeasible, can be obtained by careful beam-size and shot-
instant tuning. Moreover, we obtain such faults even when
the beam’s impact area exceeds a single SRAM cell. This
underlines the need to protect small data objects, such as
pointers, counters or flags, against “surgical” faults targeting
a specific byte in memory and nothing else.
II. THE ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD
We assume that the reader is familiar with the AES [10] that
we recall here for the ease of reference.
The AES-128 encrypts 128-bit plaintexts into 128-bit ci-
phertexts using a 128-bit key K. The algorithm performs
10 rounds (after a short initial round) and consists of two
separated processes: a key schedule that derives round keys
and the encryption routine itself. During decryption key sched-
ule is reversed and encryption is replaced by a very similar
decryption process.
The initial round uses K0 = K as a round key; for
all subsequent rounds, new round keys Ki are calculated
from their predecessors Ki−1. Figure 1 illustrates the AES’
structure.
In most implementations theKis are computed and stored in
memory before encryption starts. Encryption treats the 16-byte
plaintextM as a 4×4 byte matrix. Each round, except the first
and the last, includes four steps: A substitution of the matrix’s
contents using a lookup table (SubBytes), a rotation of the
matrix’s rows (ShiftRows) and a linear transform in GF(28)
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Fig. 1. The AES - General Outline.
(MixColumns) combining each matrix element with other
column elements weighted by different coefficients (1, 2 or 3).
At the end of each round Ki is xored with MixColumns’s
result (an operation called AddRoundKey).
III. LASER FAULT INJECTION
Laser (Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Ra-
diation) is a stimulated-emission electromagnetic radiation in
the visible or the invisible domain. Laser light is monochro-
matic, unidirectional, coherent and artificial (i.e. laser does not
spontaneously exist in nature). Laser light can be generated as
a beam of very small diameter (a few µm). The beam can pass
through various material obstacles before impacting a target
during a very short duration.
Laser impacts on electronic circuits are known to alter func-
tioning. In particular, SRAM (Static Random Access Memory)
laser exposure is known to cause bit-flips [12], [6], [5], a
phenomenon called Single Event Upset (SEU). By tuning the
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Fig. 2. Effects of one faulty round key byte at different rounds.
beam’s energy level below a destructive threshold, the target
will not suffer any permanent damage. In a laser attack, the
opponent usually controls the beam’s diameter, wavelength,
amount of emitted energy, impact coordinates (attacked circuit
part) and the exposure’s duration. Sometimes, the opponent
may also control the impact’s moment1, the target’s clock
frequency, Vcc and temperature. Finally, laser attacks may
indifferently target the chip’s front side or back side.
IV. PIRET-QUISQUATER DFA
Differential Fault Analysis [2] (DFA) is an analysis tech-
nique exploiting differences between correct and faulty out-
puts. Several byte-level and bit-level AES DFA variants exist
(e.g. [8], [9], [7], [3]). Given the dependence of these attacks
on precise “surgical” fault injection, the feasibility of bit/byte-
level DFA remained somewhat unclear.
[11] describes a byte-level DFA on AES (the so-called
Piret-Quisquater’s DFA). This attack requires the injection
of a single-byte fault into the temporary ciphertext between
the MixColumn exit of the antepenultimate round and the
MixColumn input of the penultimate round to be successful.
A means to meet this requirement is to inject a single-byte
fault into the antepenultimate round key (namely K8). As
a consequence, a faulty ciphertext with four faulty bytes is
obtained (see Figure 2). Then, the attack scheme described
in [11] allows to infer some informations on the four cor-
responding bytes of K10 by processing the correct and faulty
ciphertexts and checking over the list of all the related possible
single-byte faults.
By repeating this process twice (i.e. by iterating the attack
for a different plaintext) the exact value of the four bytes of
K10 is found with a success rate of about 98% [11]. The
procedure is repeated to target K10’s remaining bytes. Finally,
K = K0 is inferred by reversing the key schedule. We show
that this attack can be implemented, even when the laser spot
is wider than the SRAM’s cell.
V. PRACTICAL SINGLE-BYTE FAULT INJECTION
Outline: After chip decapsulation and a mapping of the
chip’s components, we selected a large target area, given our
1i.e. the impact’s synchrony with a given clock cycle of the target.
Fig. 3. Decapsulated chip (SRAM is on the left middle and bottom side).
knowledge of the implementation. Using automated search on
the chip’s front-side, we modified the impact’s coordinates,
the beam parameters and timing until a one byte fault was
obtained. Finally, Piret-Quisquater’s attack was performed.
The target is an 8-bit 0.35 µm 16 MHz RISC microcontroller
with an integrated 4KB SRAM and no countermeasures. The
device runs SOSSE (Simple Operating System for Smartcard
Education [4]) to which we added some commands, most
notably for feeding-in cleartexts and retrieving ciphertexts. K
was embedded in the code. As encryption starts, the Kis are
derived and stored in SRAM. The laser, shown in Figures 7
and 8, is equipped with a YAG laser emitter in three different
wavelengths: green, infrared and ultraviolet.
The spot’s diameter can be set between 0 and 2500µm.
As the beam passes through a lens, it gets reduced by the
lens’ zoom factor and loses a big part of its energy. Our
experiments were conducted with a 20× Mitutoyo lens, a
green2 beam of ∅4µm and ≃ 15pJ per shot. The circuit is
installed on a programmable Prior Scientific X-Y positioning
table3. The X-Y table, card reader, laser and an FPGA trigger
board, were connected via RS-232 to a control PC. The FPGA
trigger board receives an activation signal from the reader and
sends a trigger signal to the laser after a delay defined by the
control PC.
Experiments were conducted in ambient temperature and at
Vcc = 5V . These parameters are within the device’s normal
operating conditions 2.7V ≤ Vcc ≤ 5.5V .
The chip was decapsulated by chemical etching using a
Nisene JetEtch automated acid decapsulator. The decapsulator
can be programmed for the chemical opening of different chip
types using different ratios of nitric acid (HNO3) and sulfuric
acid (H2SO4), at a desired temperature and during a specified
time. For opening our chip, we used only nitric acid at 80◦C
for 40 seconds. The etched chip (Figure 3) successfully passed
functional tests before and during fault injection.
As it is very difficult to target the chip’s (ALU) (Arithmetic
Logic Unit) and inject only a single-byte fault during a very
specific instant between the end of MixColumn of the 8-
th round and before the MixColumn of the 9-th round, we
decided to target K8.
Finding the SRAM area containing K8 and properly tuning
the laser’s parameters is very time consuming. The number of
2532nm wavelength.
3Motorized stepper stage for upright microscopes with 0,1 µm steps.
Fig. 4. Decapsulated chip (closeup on SRAM).
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Fig. 5. Attack’s timing.
TABLE I
POTENTIAL FAULTY KiS AS FUNCTION OF OBSERVED FAULTY
CIPHERTEXT BYTES.
number of faulty C bytes potential faulty round keys
K10 K9 K8 previous round keys
1, 2, 3 ! !
4, . . . , 15 ! ! !
16 ! ! ! !
faults in the ciphertext (C), their position and their contents
indicate which round key has been hit. MixColumns will
amplify any single-byte fault occurring in any Ki preceding
K8 and result in a completely faulty ciphertext (we call such
a bad event an “early fault”). As shown in Figure 2, a single-
byte fault on K8 changes 4 ciphertext bytes while a fault in
K9 or K10 changes only one byte. However, injected faults
are not always limited to a single byte and/or to a single Ki.
When more than 4 ciphertext bytes are faulty, it is difficult
to determine if the observed result is due to an early fault or
to several faults in K8, K9 and K10 (Table I). After finding
sensitive SRAM areas that affect the ciphertext, and before
targeting K8, we tried to find the memory cells containing
K10. This is necessary for tuning beam-size and energy to
limit the fault injection area to very few bytes and preferably
one byte. Despite fine-grained energy and spatial control we
detected faults in keys neighboring K8. To overcome this
problem, we isolated K9 and K10 from faults and restricted
the shot to a 100 µs interval between the use of K7 and K8
(Figure 5).
Figure 6 shows how we could confine faults to a single byte
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Fig. 6. Exploration process.
Fig. 7. Laser and target (general overview).
of K9. When more than one faulty byte existed, we could
obtain single byte faults by controlling the laser’s shooting
time. Figure 6 is just a model of the real SRAM (Figure 4) to
describe our technique and does not correspond to real address
allocation. We could successfully inject faults into 13 bytes of
K8. This sufficed to run Piret & Quisquater attack.
As shown in the topmost part of Figure 6, we searched K8’s
precise storage area by monitoring the number and the type of
faults in the ciphertext. Then (middle part of Figure 6), by a
precise beam localization, we managed to inject faults only in
K8. This, however, did not turn out to be fully deterministic
as sometimes we would also inflict faults to previous round
keys. At that point (lowermost part of Figure 6), by fine-tuning
spatial and temporal beam localization (just after the use of
Fig. 8. Laser and target (closeup).
K7), we managed to restrict the injected faults only to K8.
This is the exact assumption of Piret-Quisquater’s scenario.
VI. CONCLUSION
We implemented Piret-Quisquater’s attack [11] using laser
fault injection. [11] is usually regarded as the most effective
fault attack on AES as it requires only two faulty ciphertexts.
This effectiveness comes at the price of stringent fault injection
assumptions. The experiments reported in this paper also apply
to other attacks (e.g. [8], [9]) and underline the possibility
to precisely modify flags, counters, pointers and other single
memory cells that control program flow, in the absence of
countermeasures.
In summary, this note’s main conclusions are:
• It is possible to implement a single-byte laser fault attack
on an AES round key.
• Even when it is physically impossible to target a single-
byte because the beam hits a few other bytes, careful
spatial and temporal coordination may allow to deceive
the encryption process to consider logically only a single-
byte fault that corresponds to Piret-Quisquater’s scheme.
• It is possible to reproduce the same faults on different
plaintexts. This assesses the reality of Piret-Quisquater’s
scenario on unprotected chips.
As we send this paper to press we can already refer the
reader to recent reproducible single-bit fault injection results
[1].
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